Robbery plea vacated over speedy trial violation

Listen to this article

An appellate court has vacated a guilty plea in a robbery and grand larceny case because the defendant received ineffective legal representation.

The defendant, Ali Bloodworth, pleaded guilty in August 2015 to first-degree robbery and third-degree grand larceny before state Supreme Court Judge John J. Brunetti.

Bloodworth’s appellate attorney, Linda M. Campbell, argued that Bloodworth was denied effective assistance of counsel because of the trial attorney’s failure to make proper speedy trial motions.

The Appellate Division of state Supreme Court, Fourth Department, agreed and sent the case back to Supreme Court in Syracuse.

Campbell argued, and the prosecution did not dispute, that charges were filed against Bloodworth on Jan. 8, 2014, and an indictment was filed on June 27, 2014. Bloodworth was arraigned on the indictment on July 14, 2014, when the prosecution announced readiness for trial.

Bloodworth filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment under New York Criminal Procedure Law because the prosecutor did not announce readiness for trial within six months, as required under New York Criminal Procedure Law.

Bloodworth’s trial attorney field “boilerplate motions,” Campbell told the Fourth Department panel during oral arguments on April 9.

“He doesn’t address the speedy trial argument at all in those motions … So the defendant files his own pro se … motion where he clearly raises the speedy trial argument,” she told the panel.

“What you see is the defendant taking charge where his lawyer is not,” Campbell said.

Brunetti denied the pro se motion, noting the date of the filing of the indictment and that the prosecution announced their readiness for trial. But Brunetti did not mention that the prosecution did not announce their readiness until July 14.

After a superseding indictment was filed, Bloodworth’s lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment, also based on speedy trial statutes.

The defense counsel laid out the pertinent dates of the start of the action and Bloodworth’s arraignment, where the prosecution announced their readiness for trial, but he did not argue that the relevant period exceeded six months.

In court, Brunetti estimated that the period between the commencement of the action and the prosecution’s stated readiness for trial was five months and seven days, although it was actually six months and six days.

Brunetti asked Bloodworth’s lawyer if there were any other pertinent facts, but Bloodworth’s lawyer failed to point out Brunetti’s miscalculation.

“Although, as noted, defense counsel made a speedy trial claim, we conclude that there was no strategic or legitimate explanation for defense counsel’s failure to alert the court that it had inaccurately calculated that only five months and seven days had passed between the commencement of the action and the People’s statement of readiness and that, instead, more than six months had elapsed,” the Fourth Department wrote in the decision released June 28.

[email protected] (585) 232-2035