Court takes up seatbelt suit preemption

At oral arguments this week, the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court were trying to figure out whether federal seatbelt regulations leave room for state law based tort claims.

The case of Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America stems from a 2002 fatal auto accident involving a 1993 Mazda minivan. Thanh Williamson was seated in the middle seat in the van’s center row, which was equipped with a so-called “type 1” seatbelt with a strap across the lap. She was belted, but the impact of the crash threw her upper body forward with such force as to cause fatal internal injuries.

Her family sued the automaker for negligence and products liability, claiming Mazda should have installed “type 2” belts with a shoulder strap in the minivan.

Mazda moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming the plaintiffs’ suit was preempted by federal law.

The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards prohibit states from regulating vehicle passenger restraints, but contain a “savings clause” that states “compliance does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” The regulations go on to require “type 2” seatbelts for window seats in automobiles, but center seats require only “type 1” belts. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration noted that requiring “type 2” belts in center seats would be too costly for the resulting safety benefits.

A trial court granted Mazda’s motion, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Cost of safety?

Martin N. Buchanan, a partner in the San Diego firm Niddrie Fish & Buchanan, argued on the Williamsons’ behalf that the regulations allow tort suits.

“The claim is not preempted, because it is perfectly consistent with and would not frustrate the objectives of the” regulations, Buchanan said.

Justice Antonin Scalia wasn’t sure it was that clear cut, given the rules’ prohibition of state regulations.

“Why would the federal government … trust juries to supplement whatever the federal rules are, but not allow state agencies to?” Justice Scalia asked. “Why does that make any sense?”

“Ultimately that is a call for Congress to make,” Buchanan replied.

When Buchanan argued that “our lawsuit is perfectly consistent with the agency’s objective of encouraging [type 2] seatbelts,” Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. pointed out the cost considerations.

“[That argument] ignores one half of the cost-benefit analysis,” said Chief Justice Roberts, who several times questioned the cost of implementing such changes.

Buchanan noted out that General Motors was installing shoulder strap seatbelts in its minivans.

“It was perfectly feasible for Mazda to do so [when] it manufactures this vehicle,” he said.

William M Jay, assistant to the solicitor general arguing as amicus on behalf of the family, pointed out that the “savings clause makes it clear that [automakers] are not exempt from the consequences” of choosing to install seatbelts without shoulder straps.

Chief Justice Roberts suggested that argument again ignored cost considerations.

“It’s clear … that [regulators] didn’t want to mandate ‘type 2′ seatbelts … because of the costs,” he said.

‘Safety trade offs’

Gregory G. Garre, a partner in the Washington office of Latham & Watkins, argued for Mazda that the regulations preempt state claims.

“What the agency wanted here was flexibility [because] there are safety trade offs” for different designs, he said.

Justice Stephen Breyer said preemption was easy to achieve if that was what NHTSA intended.

“If the agency wants to displace those sorts of suits, all they have to do is say [so],” Justice Breyer said. “It would make our jobs easier.”

When Garre argued that failing to find preemption would expose manufacturers to a host of liability claims, Justice Sonia Sotomayor questioned whether that was a big issue.

“Manufacturers are always at risk for liability claims,” she said. “I don’t know why, when an agency creates a minimum [standard] manufacturers should be impliedly [protected] from such claims.”

Although the Court decided last year in the landmark ruling Wyeth v. Levine that state law claims against pharmaceutical companies are not impliedly preempted by federal drug regulations, that case was not mentioned until the last minute of Wednesday’s oral arguments — at the end of Buchanan’s rebuttal.

“That statute didn’t even have a savings clause,” Buchanan said, arguing that the current case was easier to decide.

Justice Elena Kagan recused herself from consideration of the case. A ruling from the Court is expected later this term.