NY appeals court upholds dismissal of lawsuit involving State Trooper

A state appellate court has upheld a Court of Claims decision that dismissed a personal injury case involving a New York State Trooper.

In August 2024, Court of Claims Judge David Sampson granted a defense motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claim.

The plaintiffs appealed and the Appellate Division of state Supreme Court, Fourth Department, unanimously affirmed Sampson.

The plaintiffs — a married couple and their two children —filed the complaint seeking damages for injuries allegedly suffered by the mother and her children when their collided with a vehicle operated by State Trooper Chad Barry.

The lawsuit alleged that Barry “negligently and recklessly attempted pursuit of a traffic violator by making a U-turn into oncoming traffic.”

After the discovery stage, attorneys for the state moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim, on the grounds that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction over the trooper, that the trooper’s actions were privileged under state Vehicle and Traffic Law, and that the trooper did not act with “reckless disregard for the safety of others.”

The claimants opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment also.

Sampson granted the defense motion and denied the cross-motion on grounds that his court lacked jurisdiction over the trooper and the New York State Police, that the reckless disregard standard of care applied, and that the trooper’s conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others.

The claimants appealed, and the Fourth Department affirmed.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited and does not extend to claims against individuals, such as the trooper, the Fourth Department wrote.

“The same rule applies to state agencies, including the (New York State Police), where, as here, the state is the real party in interest,” the panel wrote.

The court also ruled that Sampson properly granted the state’s motion dismissing the claim against the state.

“Contrary to claimants’ contention, the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 1104 (e) applies here,” the court wrote.

That section of the law grants special privileges to the driver of “an authorized emergency vehicle, when involved in an emergency operation.”

One of those “privileges” is the ability to disregard regulations governing “directions of movement or turning in specified directions,” the court wrote.

The claimants conceded that Barry was operating an authorized emergency vehicle at the time of the accident, but they argued that he was not engaged in an emergency operation when he made a U-turn to investigate, what they considered “a mere traffic infraction that posed no danger to the public.”

The Fourth Department disagreed.

“As defined in Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 114-b, the term ‘emergency operation’ includes pursuit of ‘an actual or suspected violator of the law,’” the court wrote.

Qualifying violations include minor traffic infractions, such as driving with excessively tinted windows, or operating a motor vehicle with an expired inspection sticker.

“A U-turn, such as the one made by the trooper, is privileged conduct,” the Fourth Department ruled.

“We conclude that defendants met their burden of establishing that the trooper was not reckless in the manner in which he executed his U-turn and that claimants failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition,” the Fourth Department wrote.

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