Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility

New York Court of Appeals reverses convictions on speedy trial grounds

Bennett Loudon//April 22, 2026//

New York Court of Appeals reverses convictions on speedy trial grounds

Bennett Loudon//April 22, 2026//

Listen to this article

The New York State Court of Appeals has reversed a lower court ruling that denied a defendant’s motion claiming a speedy trial violation.

The state’s highest court ruled that defendant Naim Roper’s CPL 30.30 motion, made in writing before his bench trial on misdemeanor charges started, was timely and provided the prosecution with reasonable notice.

In a decision released Tuesday, the Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of the speedy trial motion.

Roper, who was serving a sentence at Rikers Island, allegedly assaulted a corrections officer in January 2011. He was charged with third-degree assault, menacing, second-degree harassment, and second-degree obstruction of governmental administration.

The trial court judge set several trial dates, and each time the prosecution was not ready. At one point, the judge noted “it might be necessary to release the defendant on 30.30 grounds.”

Eventually, the judge stated that the following day was the last day of the statutory period and the prosecution had to be ready for trial.

A week later, on July 23, 2012, nearly a year after Roper was charged, both parties announced they were ready for trial.

Roper’s attorney told the judge that she intended to file a speedy trial motion. When she made the written motion the judge denied it, ruling it was untimely and lacked notice to the prosecution, according to the Court of Appeals decision, written by Judge Michael J. Garcia.

After the prosecution reduced the charges to attempted third-degree assault, menacing, and harassment, the case proceeded to a bench trial.  After hearing testimony from the corrections officer and Roper, the judge found Roper guilty on all counts.

Roper’s attorney tried to resubmit the speedy trial motion, but it  was rejected.

Roper was then sentenced to concurrent terms of 90 days on the attempted assault count, 90 days on the menacing charge, and 15 days on the harassment violation.

On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court judge and Roper appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Under Criminal Procedure Law, a motion to dismiss must be granted when the prosecution is not ready for trial within 90 days after the commencement of misdemeanor charges.

Roper was required to file his speedy trial motion before the start of the trial or entry of a guilty plea “in writing and upon reasonable notice to the people,” Garcia wrote.

“Defendant’s motion met these requirements,” he wrote.

“We reject the People’s argument here that defendant’s speedy trial motion was never properly made,” he wrote.

On this record, defendant complied with the plain language of the governing statute,” Garcia wrote.

“Defendant’s motion was made in writing and provided the requisite notice,” Garcia wrote.

“Defendant made his motion on the date trial was set to begin, 11 months after his arraignment, and alleged 326 days chargeable to the People,” Garcia wrote.

“That motion contained nine pages of detailed calculations of days and arguments about why each period should be charged to the People,” he wrote.

The prosecutor claims that only 54 of those days were chargeable to them.

“Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the case remitted to Supreme Court,” Garcia wrote.

[email protected] / (585) 232-2035

Case Digests

See all Case Digests

Law News

See All Law News

Polls

How Is My Site?

View Results

Loading ... Loading ...